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Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18218 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff (Respondents) to recover 
allegedly delinquent payments on a contract for the purchase of certain pro-
perty and seeking a forclosure on that property. Defendant (Appellant) also 
filed a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff because of breaches in the contract 
by the Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the time the case was set for trial, the parties entered into 
a Stipulation on the record, wherein each of the parties was to perfonn cer-
tain acts. Plaintiff was represented by Counsel, and Defendant was acting 
Pro Se. Counsel for Plaintiff thereafter presented a written Stipulation 
to the Court (Record 141-145) but the Defendant did not agree that the written 
Stipulation accurately set forth the verbal Stipulation to which he had agreed 
and he sent a lett'er to Judge Palmer (R. 140) in which he set forth those 
ob.iections. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Thereafter, Plaintiff and Defendant both defaulted in a portion 
of the Stipulation, but Plaintiff's Counsel submitted an Affidavit (R. 162) 
representing that Defendant had defaulted and the court thereafter entered 
Judgment in favor of Plaintiff based upon the Affidavit. ·The Court subse-
quently denied Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
In this appeal the Defendant-Appellant asks this Court to detennine 
that the District Court erred in granting Judgment against him based upon 
the Stipulation made by the parties, and also asks the Court to determine 
that Defendant has a right to appeal the Order signed by Judge Palmer on 
October 8, 1981 in which the written Stipulation was accepted by the Court, 
to determine that the Lower Court erred by entering said Order and said Judg-
ment, and that this case be sent back to the District Court for a trial upon 
the merits of the case as to each of the parties. 
STATNVJENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of reference in this Brief, references to the Record 
will be referred to by an "R" preceeding the page number of the Record. 
There are transcripts of three (3) separate days hearings, and for reference 
purposes, any reference to the transcript for September 9, 1981 will be re-
ferred to as "Tl" - any references to the transcript for January 28, 1982 
will be referred to as "T2", - and any references to the transcript for Feb-
ruary 11, 1982 will be referred to as "T3''. 
On or about June 27, 1979, the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, entered 
into an agreement to purchase .the stock in Naylor-Gross, Inc. , which is a 
Utah Corporation, which it was represented owned the Old Rock Mill Fann, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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together with substantial personal property located thereon. The Old Rock Mill 
Farm is real property located in Fannington, Utah, on which there is presently 
a restaurant known as the "Heidelberg" restaurant, and other related facili-
ties. 
At the time of purchase, the corporation· was ·having substantial 
financial difficulties and liabilities which had been represented to Mr. 
Backman to be approximately $110,000. Because of the financial difficulties 
at that time, the contract for the Defendant to purchase provided for a total 
price of $440, 000. 00, but did not · require Mr. · Backmm ·to pay any amounts 
of cash directly to the sellers, as stated in the contract (Rf ~7) as follows: 
11 A. $110, 000. 00, which shall be paid toward the Sellers 
debts which have been accrued by the Naylor Gross, 
Inc. Buyer and Seller will arrange for the method 
and time of payment to debtors. 
-· 
B. $3,000.00 per month beginning March 20, 1979, until 
balance is paid in full, including interest. · 
C. Sellers agree to release upper north 4 acres to Buyer, 
free and clear, upon receipt of $10,000.00 from buyer 
at any time during contract. Sellers agree to pay 
expenses of Corporation liquidation of Naylor Gross, 
Inc. · 
D. Buyer agrees to assume the present existing SBA obli-
gation of approximately $70,000.00. 
E. It is understood that this agreement is subordinate 
to the terms and provisions of a forthcoming final 
agreement which shall ~e written by the attorneys 
representing the buyer and seller and approved by all 
parties concerned. 11 
At the time of entering into the Agreement, it is questionable 
whether either party was represented by Counsel, because the Agreement was 
entered into by Naylor Gross, Inc . , and purported to sell itself. Also, 
the agreement was prepared on a Standard Uniform Real Estate Contract Form, 
even though it did not include the legal description of any property. Never-
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th el es s, it is, counsel for Defendant believes, substantially ·agreed that 
it was intended to sell the Stock of Naylor Gross, Inc., which had been repre-
sented owned the property on which the Heidelberg restaurant and related 
facilities sits, together with substantial personal property necessary to 
operate those facilities. 
Defendant took possession of the facilities, and there were then 
disputes that arose between the parties. As a result of those disputes, 
the Plaintiffs filed suit in the Second Judicial Districrt Court on December 
1, 1980. In that Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant was delin-
quent in his payments to them personally and to the Small Blsiness Administra-
tion, and they asked for a Judgment thereon, a return of the property, and 
a declaration that the Trust Deed on the property should be returned to them. 
Defendant answered and filed a Counterclaim in which he alleged 
that he was not delinquent in the payments and by way of Counterclaim alleged 
as follows: 
1. The Plaintiff had removed substantial amounts of personal pro-
perty from the premesis which belonged to the Corporation, although he did 
not know the number of items or the value of those items at the time. 
2. He had determined that the real property was not in the name 
of the Corporation as had been represented, so that his present contract 
really gave him nothing except a hollow shell, and the Plaintiffs were refus-
ing to transfer the property into the name of the Corporation. 
3. The Corporation liabilities were substantially larger than 
had been disclosed at the time of purchase by him, and since he had purchased 
the corporate stock those liabilities caused a substantial difference in 
the value of the corporate stock which had not been disclosed to him. 
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4. Although Defendant was to assume the obligation to the Small 
Business Administration, the Plaintiffs had sold or removed some of the real 
and personal property which had been pledged as collateral to the Small Bus-
iness Administration, and therefore he could not assume an .. obligation where 
collateral had been pledged where that collateral no longer belonged to the 
Corporation. 
5. The Plaintiffs had failed to clear the existing bills and obli-
gations of the Corporation as they had promised to do. 
6. The Plaintiffs had failed to pay the property taxes through 
the time period when they were committed to pay said property taxes. 
7. That Plaintiffs had failed to give Defendants c·redit for numer-
ous payments which he had made to the Creditors of the Plaintiff. 
Substantial discovery went on and there were other matters that 
proceeded, but the case was set for trial on September 9, 1981 before the 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer. At the appointed time, Plaintiff's and their 
counsel met with Defendant and Judge Palmer in Judge Palmer's chambers. 
Certain discussions were carried on regarding the possibilities of settlement 
both in the presence of Judge Palmer and some additional discussions out 
of the presence of Judge Palmer. The portion which were carried on in the 
presence of Judge Palmer were not recorded, but at the conclusion of those 
discussions, the parties had come to an agreement and they met in Judge 
Palmers chambers and entered a Stipulation into the record. That Stipulation 
is contained in Tl-1 to 19. One of the first and most important provisions 
of that Stipulation was stated at Tl-2, wherein it was stated: 
"l. The Defendant will pay, or fully assume so as to 
relieve plaintiff from all liabilities, outstanding 
-- let's see, -accounts payable that were outstanding 
against the plaintiff as of March l, 1979, in the sum 
of $110,000, plus any interest that has accrued on 
said amount. The plaintiff will, within the same 
.·. ,~~ ~ ne , . pay or fully assume so as to relieve Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services a d Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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defendant of all liability, all other accounts payable 
that existed as of March 1, 1979. The parties will 
work out, well, the parties will further stipulate 
and work out between themselves which bills, which 
accounts payable will be so satisfied or fully assurned 
by which the parties -- does that makE? sense?" 
There is no part of that transcript wherein the Defendant agrees, or even 
discusses, what penalties would be imposed if either the Defendant or the 
Plaintiff failed to abide by the provisions contained in that stipulation. 
There had been previous discussions relating to which liabilities 
would be assumed by the Plaintiff, but those matters were in fact stated 
in writing by counsel for Plaintiffs in a letter directed to the Defendant 
on November 2, 1981 (Rl69-l 72) , and the relevant portions ~ of that .letter 
are contained at R.171 wherein it is stated as follows: 
"You are hereby notified that Plaintiffs shall pay or 
fully assume that arnount of obligations within the ti~e 
provided in the Stipulation as follows: 
1. Since almost from the first week after the settlement 
there was verbal agreement between Plaintiffs and 
yourself that the tax amount attributable to.Line 26 
and verified to be $8,325.60 would be a logical item 
for Plaintiffs to take responsibility for, Plaintiffs 
will pay or fully assume so as to release you from 
any liability that amount together with all accrued 
interest and penalties attributable to that amount 
since March l, 1979." 
Following entry of the Stipulation in Court, Counsel for Plaintiff 
submitted a proposed Order to the Court for its signature (R.141-142) and 
it had attached thereto Exhibit A, which was his interpretation of the Stipu-
lation (R.143-145). Another copy of the same document is contained at (R. 
146-150). That document was submitted to Mr. Backman for his approval as 
to fonn, and he immediately ordered a copy of the transcript because it did 
not seem correct to him, and he notified Judge Palmer that he did not agree 
with the written stipulation, and his objection was sent by way of a letter 
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dated September 22, 1981 which may be found at (R.140). 
The pertinent part of the Order provided as follows: 
''If the Defendant, Thoma.s K. Backman, does not fulfill 
all of the terms and conditions relating to Defendant 
set forth in Exhibit "A" within the time provided therein, 
and if Plaintiffs have fulfilled all the tenns and condi-
tions relating to Plaintiffs, Judgment shall be entered 
in favor of Plaintiffs, Naylor-Gross, Inc., Garth L. Naylor 
and Terry Gross and against, Defendant, Thomas K. Backman . . II 
The Order was apparantly resubmitted as contained at (R.146-147), 
and was apparantly signed by Judge Palmer on October 8, 1981. 
Defendant believed that this was an appealable Order and called 
the District Court clerks office on November 4, 1981 to determine the date 
on which the Judge signed the Stipulation and Order so as to determine his 
deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal. After searching the file, the em-
ployee of the Clerk's office infonned Defendant that the Order was not signed 
and had been filed with a note "Ordered to be filed unsigned 10-23-81 by 
J. Duffy Palmer, Judge." (see R. 155). The employee in the clerks office 
had a second employee confinn that, so that Defendant was given that statement 
by two (2) separate employees in the Clerks office, and was also told that 
his Notice of Appeal would not be accepted because there was no existing 
Order to be appealed. 
Even though Defendant believed that the Order and Stipulation had 
not been signed or approved, he ma.de the $6,000.00 payment required by said 
Stipulation on September 9, 1981, and paid the other $3, 000. 00 on November 
I 
9, 1981 to show his good faith in complying with the agreement he had entered 
into in Court. 
Thereafter, on December 23, 1981, counsel for Plaintiffs filed 
an Affidavit in Court (R. 162-166) in which he indicated that the Defendant 
had not complied with the terms of the Stipulation and Order, and based upon 
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that Affidavit a Judgment was entered by the court (R.182-185) without further 
consultation or notice to Defendant. This was done notwithstanding the fact 
that Plaintiffs had not paid or "fully assumed so as to relieve Defendant 
of all liability" of the obligation to the Utah State Tax Commission in an 
amount of $$,325.60 as they had agreed to do, thereby placing them in breach 
of the Stipulation. 
It is from that Judgment, and from the entry of the Order approving 
the Stipulation that this appeal is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT BECAUSE THEY 
DID NOT HAVE "CLEAN HANDS" BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT COMPLIED 
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE STIPULATION A1'IT) ORDER OF YHE 
COURT. 
When the parties were before Judge Pallner and entered into a verbal 
Stipulation on the record, it was agreed that the Defendant would assume 
existing liabilities in the sum of $110, 000. 00 and that Plaintiff would "pay 
or fully assume, so as to relieve Defendant of all liability, all other 
accounts payable that existed as of March l, 1979. '' (Tl-3 ) (emphasis added) . 
The parties later agreed that one of the liabilities which Plaintiff would 
pay or assume so as to relieve Defendant from all liability from was an exist-
ing obligation to the Utah State Tax Corrnnission for state sales tax in an 
amount of $$,325.60. 
Defendant does challenge herein the correctness of signing the 
Order and Stipulation submitted to the court by Plaintiffs counsel, but assum-
ing arguendo for purposes of this point, that the Order was correct, that 
Order provided as follows: 
"If the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, does not fulfill 
all of the terms and conditions reltaing to Defendant set 
forth in Exhibit 'A I within the time vvw; ~°'~ +- i._,.._,....,.._..; V\ ~--1 
if Plaintiffs have fulfilled all of thC<-- c-C - ~· -- --.... ··--Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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tions relating to Plaintiffs, Judgment shall be entered 
in favor of Plaintiffs, Naylor Gross, Inc., Garth L. Naylor 
and Terry Gross, and against Defendant, Thorras K. Backman." 
(emphasis added) 
When counsel for Plaintiff submitted his Affidavit and proposed 
Judgment to the Court and represented that Defendant had not complied with 
the Stipulation, he did so without any notice to Defendant and he attempted 
to show ihc3.t he had .complied with the Stipulation by submitting to the Court 
certain. documents, including a statement from the State Tax Corrmission and 
an Assistant Attorney General to show that the amount of taxes due was 
$8,325.60 and to further indicate that Mr. Backman had not fonnally assumed 
any of the sales and withholding tax liabilities of Naylor Gross, Inc. How-
ever, that did not carry Plaintiffs burden of proof to show that Plaintiff 
had fulfilled- all of the terms and conditions of the Stipulation, and in 
fact, Plaintiff had not complied with the provisions of the Stipulation as 
it related to paying or assuming the tax obligation so as to relieve Defendant 
from liability thereon. 
The liability to the Utah State Tax Commission was in the name 
of Naylor Gross, Inc. The property which Defendant had purportedly purchased 
was the stock in Naylor Gross, Inc. Therefore, the only way that Plaintiffs 
could have complied with the Stipulation so far as it related to the State 
Tax Commission, was to either pay the obligation or to obtain a release from 
the State Tax Commission in which it agreed not to look to either the Defen-
dant or Naylor Gross, Inc. for those taxes. The record is clear that the 
Plaintiffs did not do· either of those, and they therefore have not fulfilled 
the terms of the Stipulation. 
However, Plaintiffs have argued in the District Court that this 
should not.prevent them from taking Judgment because the Defendant has taken 
+"ha TV'\C; H rm wi t.h the State Tax Commission that he is not legally responsible Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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for the obligation. Nevertheless, it is submitted that Defendant is entitled 
to take that position with the State Tax Comrrdssion, and that is not disposi-
tive of the issues in this case. The issues in each case are different. 
In fact, this is not inconsistant with the position taken in this case, be-
cause he may take the position before the Tax Commission that he is not per-
sonally liable for those obligations, but maintain that it is a corporate 
obligation of the corporation for which he purchased the stock. Therefore, 
even if he were not held responsible for those taxes before the Tax Commission 
on the basis that it is a corporate obligation, the Plaintiffs still would 
not have fulfilled their responsibility because the corporation which the 
Defendant would then own would in fact be responsible for those taxes, and 
it would ultimately reduce his value or net worth in the corporation, and 
wo:uld therefore> be coming directly out of his pocket as far as any accounting 
with the Plaintiffs is concerned. 
However, notwithstanding any position taken by the Defendant with 
the Tax Commission, there is a statute which makes him liable for those taxes 
based upon certain premesis, which is Section 59-15-10, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, which provides as follows: 
"The tax imposed by this act shall be a lien upon the.pro-
per:ty of any wholesaler or retailer or proprietor who shall 
~_ell out his business or stock of goods or shall quit bus-
iness and such person shall be required to make out tne 
return provided for under Section 59-15-5, within thirty (30) days after the date he sold out his business or stock 
of goods or quit business and his successor in business 
shall be required to withhold slifTicient of' the purchase 
money to cover the amount of' said taxes due and unpaid 
until such time as the former owner shall prOduce a receipt 
from the Tax Corrnnission showing that the taxes have been 
paid, or a certificate that no taxes are due. If the pur-
chaser of a business or stock of goods shall fail to with-
hold the purchase money as above provided and the taxes 
shall be due and unpaid after the thirty (30) day period 
allowed, he shall be personally liable for the payment of 
the taxes collected and unpaid by the former owner." 
(Emphasis added) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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It is clear from the record, that the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, purchased 
the business from the Plaintiffs on or about March 1, 1979, and that there 
were delinquent sales and use truces which constituted Judgments against the 
property in an amount, including all penalties and interest, of nearly $9,000, 
and it is equally clear that the Defendant failed to withhold from the pur-
chase money sufficient amounts to pay the truces due and unpaid, and that 
those amounts were not paid within thirty (30) days thereafter, and in fact 
have still not been paid. Based. upon that situation, it is clear that the 
statute makes the Defendant personally liable for the payment of those truces. 
Therefore, it is clear that the only way that Plaintiffs could 
comply with the Stipulation which they entered into in Court is to either 
pay to the True Commission the amount of truces that were due at the time the 
business was ptirchased, or in the alternative, to obtain a release from the 
Utah State True Commission. 
It is submitted that the Plaintiffs did not perfonn either one of 
those steps, and certainly have not provided the Court with any evidence 
that such steps have in fact been taken, and until such steps are taken, 
the PJ.aihtiff_s are_ ID breach of the Stipulation entered into before Judge Palmer 
even assuming arguendo that the Defendant did in fact breach that agreement. 
Therefore, where the Plaintiffs have breached the Stipulation, they 
do not have "clean hands" and cannot ask the Court to enforce the Stipulation 
against the Defendant while they are personally in default and in breach 
of the Stipulation they entered into and therefore do not have clean hands. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the District Court 
erred in granting Judgment to Plaintiffs, and the Court· should reverse that 
Judgment and send the case back for a trial upon its merits. 
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POINT II 
NO NOTICE WAS GIVEN TO DEFENDANT THAT A JUDGMENT WAS GOING 
'ID BE REQUESTED, AND COPIES OF THE AFFIDAVIT AND JUIX1MENT 
WERE NOT SERVED UPON DEFENDANT UNTIL AFTER THE JUDGMENT 
HAD BEEN EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COUR'I'. 
Assuming arguendo, for purposes of this Brief, that the Judge had 
correctly entered the Order and Stipulation dated October 8, 1981, the Judg-
ment was still entered improperly and incorrectly against the Defendant. 
The Judgment was entered by presenting to Judge Palmer an Affidavit 
and proP<?sed Judgment from the Plaintiff. No copy of that Affidavit or pro-· 
posed Judgment was ever served upon the Plaintiff prior to the tlir~ it was 
executed and entered by the Court, and it was therefore handled as an ex 
parte proceeding. 
It is submitted that it should have been handled as a Motion for 
a Judgment with the Affidavit, with the Defendant to have an opportunity 
to respond to the Motion and any facts alleged in the Affidavit. Rule 6d, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: 
"A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex 
parte, and Notice of the hearing thereof, shall be served 
not later than five (5) days before the time specified for 
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these 
rules or by order of the Court. Such an Order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a Motion 
is supported by Affidavit, the Affidavit shall be served 
with the Motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 
59(c), opposing Affidavits may be served not later than 
one (1) day before the hearing, unless the Court permits 
them to be served at some other time period." (Emphasis added) 
There is no reason at all why the Judgment should not have been 
applied for by way of Motion instead of ex parte, and there is no reason 
at all why Defendant should not have been served a copy of the Motion and 
Affidavit, nor is there any reason why he should not have had an opportunity 
to respond with an opposing Affidavit. Instead of following Rule 6(d) of 
the Utah .. Rules of Civil Procedure, counsel fo~ ni ~..: _._..: "'"' ---- ____ , _ , 
ex parte basis. 
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Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that counsel for Plaintiff 
and the Court failed to properly adhere to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and the Judgment which was improperly entered should be reversed and the 
case should.be sent. back for a trial upon its merits. 
POINT III 
THE GRANTING OF A JUDGMENT WITHOUT NOTICE AND ~JITHOUT AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND RESPOND CONSTITUTES A DENIAL 
OF DUE PROCESS TO THE DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
ALSO PURSUANT TO SECTION 7, ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
The relevant portions of Section 1 of the Fomyeenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States provides as follows:!. 
provcides: 
"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty 
or pr?perty, without due process of law; '' 
In addition, Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Utah 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." · · 
It clearly cannot be denied that the Judgment entered by the Court 
in this case deprives the Defendant of property. The Defendant had entered 
into an agreement to purchase the business for a sum of $440,000, and the 
record reflects that the Defendant, Thomas K. Backman, as of the time of 
the Judgment, had made substantial payments thereon, including the payment 
of $90, 000. 00 of the required $110, 000. 00 liabilities to be assumed, payment 
of $31,000.00 on the Small Business Administration loan, payment of $54,000.00 
in monthly payments, and had made improvements of $25 ,000.00, for a total 
amount as of the time of the Judgment which he had paid in excess of $200,000 
It is represented that additional payments have been rrede since that time. 
Therefore, the Defendant has clearly been deprived of substantial property 
·· " Judgment. 
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The only question theri is whether Defendant was granted due process 
of law by the manner in which the Judgment was entered. 
As has been stated above, the Judgment was entered without any 
Notice of any type being given to Defendant, and without any opportunity 
to submit an opposing Affidavit to indicate to the Court that the Plaintiffs 
had not complied with the relevant portions of the Stipulation. In addition, 
the Judgment was granted without said matter being presented to the Court 
by way of a Motion as would · no:rrnctlly be required by Rule 6 ( d) , Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
The Defendant, in the Stipulation entered into before the Court, 
did not .;_ agree that any Judgment could be granted if there was non-compliance 
with the Stipulation, and_ especially did not provide that the Judgment could 
be granted without any Notice or hearing permitted to him. In addition, 
the Order which was entered by the Judge approving the Stipulation and state-
ing that Judgment would be granted, did not state that Judgment would be 
entered without Notice to the Defendant. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that when a Judgment was 
taken against the Defendant without any notice being given to him and without 
any opportunity to respond and present an opposing Affidavit to the Court, 
• that Defendant has been deprived of property without due process of law, 
and that this violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
and this case should be sent back to the Court for a trial upon its merits. 
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POINT IV 
THERE WERE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH WERE NOT YET RESOLVED, AND 
'I'HE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED JUDGMENT WHILE SUCH ISSUES 
OF FACT WERE AS YET UNDETERMINED. 
The Judgment entered by the court was presented in a manner which 
is not specifically provided for by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Never-
theless, it was procedurally very s:irhilar to a Motion for Summary Judgment · 
which is provided for by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A 
portion of Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: 
"The Judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
Pleadings, Depositions, Answers to Interrogatories, and 
Admissions of file, together with the Affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a Judgment 
as a matter of law. 11 (emphasis added) 
It is submitted that there were still issues of fact to be determin-
ed in this case. Specifically, if the Court had given Defendant an opportun-
ity to present an opposing Affidavit, Defendant would have presented an 
Affidavit showing that Plaintiffs had not complied with all of the require-
ments of the Stipulation, and therefore would not have been entitled to the 
Judgment. Instead, Defendant was denied that right. 
Nevertheless, there were issues of fact which should have been 
resolved by the District Court before entering a Judgment in favor of Plain-
tiffs, and it is respectfully submitted that the case should be sent back 
to the District Cburt for a trial upon the merits of the case. 
POINT V 
THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE COURT ON OCTOBER S, 19Sl, WHICH 
APPROVED THE WRITTEN STIPULATION AS STATED BY PLAINTIFFS 
COIB'JSEL, BUT NOT SIGNED BY DEFENDANT, WENT BEYOND THE 
AGREE1v1ENT OF THE PARTIES AND SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN ENTERED 
BY THE COURT. 
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On September 9, 1981, the parties met at the time the case was 
set for trial, and numerous discussions were held in the presence of the 
Court to begin with, following which there were numerous and lengthy discus-
sions held out of the presence of the Court, and following that the parties 
re-entered the Court's presence and placed a verbal stipulation upon the 
record before the Judge and the Court Reporter. 
Prior to that Stipulation being entered upon the record, it is 
obvious from the file that each of the parties believed they had good and 
valid points to present to the Court at the time of trial. 
Nevertheless, in an effort to attempt to settle the case, it is 
")1 
obvious that each of the parties had made certain concessions to reach the 
Stipulation which was entered upon the Court record before Judge Palmer and 
it must also be remembered that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney, 
whereas Defendant was acting pro se and was not represented by an attorney. 
At the conclusion of the discussions, the verbal stipulation was 
entered on the Court record and is fully disclosed in the document herein 
referred to as Tl, which is the Reporters transcript of the proceedings for 
Wednesday, September 9, 1981. A full reading of that transcript will not. 
disclose any agreement by the Defendant to have Judgment entered in the event 
that either he or Plaintiff was not able to fully comply with the provisions 
of that Stipulation. 
At the time theDefendants Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order 
was argued before the Court, there were comments made by Judge Palmer that 
would indicate he felt earlier discussions, which were not on the record, 
had discussed the possibilty of Judgment being entered against Defendant, 
and there were also statements which would indicate that any Stipulation 
would have to have some provision for Judgment if it was not complied with. 
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Notwithstanding those comments by Judge Palmer, it is clear that 
Judge Palmer was not present during the entire discussions which led up to 
that Stipulation. Judge Palmer did not know what concessions had been made 
by each of the parties, nor did he know the significance of each of those 
concessions made by each of the parties. Further, it is just as obvious 
that if there needed to be a provision to allow for Judgment if Defendant 
did not comply with the Stipulation, it is just as obvious that there should 
have been a similar type of provision for Judgment if Defendant fully complied 
with the Stipulation but Plaintiff did not comply with his portion of the 
Stipulation: Where is any such a statement contained in the Exhibit "A" 
attached to the Order which was drafted by Plaintiffs counsel? If it is, 
in fact, obvious that Judgrr~nt would need to be granted, why did Plaintiffs 
attorney not put in a recipricol provision in case Plaintiff failed to comply, 
but Defendant fully complied? 
It is submitted that the Order and Stipulation were drafted by 
Plaintiff, the party which was represented by counsel at the proceeding, 
and that Plaintiffs counsel attempted to take advantage of Defendant because 
he was not represented by counsel and to come through the Stipulation with 
the clear advantage and benefit. 
It is respectfully submitted that when the parties were negotiating 
that there was "give and take" by each of the parties and that there were 
certain concessions made by each of the parties. Judge Palmer, in signing 
the Order dated October 8, 1981, presumed that all of the give and take was 
by Defendant, and that Plaintiffs were entitled to have every questionable 
item construed in their favor. However, such is not the case, and Defendant 
is entitled to have the Stipulation which he made and entered into interpreted 
within the walls of that Stipulation as it was placed on the record. Any 
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on the record, were not part of the Stipulation actually entered into, and 
were merely preliminary discussions in attempting to see if a basis for agree-
ment could be reached. 
In addition, since Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and since 
it was Plaintiffs counsel who stated the initial Stipulation on the record, 
it is submitted that any shortcoming in that Stipulation should be construed 
against the parties so represented by counsel and in favor of the party not 
represented by counsel. If a Judgment was desired if there was no compliance 
with the Stipulation, then such procedural problems should have been covered 
by the party represented by counsel, and cannot be const\lled against the 
party not represented by counsel. 
In summary, it is respectfully submitted that the Order dated Octo-
ber 8, 19Sl, was improperly entered by the Court and it exceeded. the Stipula-
tion which had been entered into by the Defendant, and the Defendant rray 
well not have entered into the Stipulation if a provision for Judgment had 
been requested in his presence while the Stipulation was actually being placed 
on the record. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the Plaintiff does not have clean hands because they 
did not comply with the provisions of the Stipulation relating to them, and 
they are therefore not entitled to hold the Defendant strictly to the provi-
sions of the Stipulation while they are also in non-compliance. Further, 
if the Plaintiffs intended to ask the Court for a Judgment for any alleged 
non-compliance by the Defendant, they should have given the Defendant Notice 
of their intention to make such a request, they should have made a formal 
Motion in compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and they should 
have given the Defendant an opportunity to present Affidavit 
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to present the Defendant's side of the story. The failure by Plaintiff to 
give such notice and opportunities to the Defendant is a clear violation 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is a clear denial of the constitu-
tional rights of the Defendant as provided by the Constitutions of the United 
States and the State of Utah. Further, the Order and written Stipulation 
upon which the Judgment was based was clearly improperly entered. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should 
reverse the decision of the District Court and should return it to the Dis-
trict Court for a trial upon its merits. 
DATED this 9z{day of July, 1982. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS 
~~~ G. Blaine Davis 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I did deliver two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant to Mr. John T. Kesler, Attorney 
for Plaintiff-Respondent, 115 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, 
this ~.i:=faay of July, 1982. 
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